According to the perceived wisdom, as a conflict continues on longer the public will become less interested in continuing it. It is the average citizen who pays for both economic and human costs.
The Russian public’s attitude is difficult to assess, even as Russia’s war in Ukraine, which began in February 2022, enters its fifth and final year. A recent survey found that just over half the Russians expect it to be resolved by 2026, but a majority of Russians believe that if negotiations do not succeed, Moscow should “escalate”, using greater force.
We, as observers of Russian culture and society, believe that this ambiguity gives Vladimir Putin cover for continuing to push hard towards his Ukrainian goals. A deeper look at Russian society’s support of the war also suggests it may be more fragile than President Putin would have liked to think.
Putin’s Social Contract
Since the beginning of the conflict the Western strategy was based on the assumption that the Russian society or elite would ultimately convince Putin to end the war.
It is also based on an assumption that Putinism’s legitimacy rests in a sort of social contract: the Russian people are loyal to the Kremlin as long as they have a high standard of living, and can live their lives privately without state interference.
Many analysts thought that the Russian economy was in trouble since 2014.
This led them to believe that it would be a while before this full-scale invasion. After four years of conflict, exclusion from European market and tripling military expenditures have led to an economic slump and increased pressure on the living standard.
The social contract method tends to minimize the importance of ideologies.
Putin’s propaganda to “Make Russia Great Again”, which he has been promoting for some time, may resonate with an important part of the Russian population. Since the start of the Ukraine crisis, polls consistently place Putin’s rating at or above 80%.
It is obvious that the validity of poll results in a society that’s at war and ruled by an authoritarian regime cannot be accepted at face value. One shouldn’t discount the possibility that some of this support may be genuine, and that it is not only based on an economic stability but that there are also people who have endorsed Putin’s promise to restore Russia’s influence and power on the international stage.
Putin is leading Muscovites into a dark corner?
Hector Teramal/AFP via Getty Images
Rallying Russians
Scholars have pointed to an “employee rally around the flag effect”. Putin’s popularity rating increased after the military action against Ukraine both in 2014 and in 2022.
The surge of support for Putin is difficult to determine whether it is a real shift in public opinion, or a reaction to the media and the response that people consider acceptable.
Kremlin tried to conceal the cost of war to the public. They hid the real death toll, and avoided a full-scale conscription by hiring highly-paid volunteers. The Kremlin is trying to stabilize the economy by using the reserve funds of the country.
The question remains whether or not the “Putin Consensus” will collapse in the future, if and when the cost of war begins to be felt by a majority among Russians.
Problems with voting
According to observers, there is a consensus that only a minority of Russians are against the war.
A slightly larger majority enthusiastically supports the war. And the rest passively support what the government is doing.
Some independent pollsters still conduct surveys in Russia and report that respondents support the “special operation” (military action) against Ukraine with numbers ranging from 60% to 70%.
Researchers have noted that it is difficult to get an accurate picture of Russian public sentiment, as the questions asked could make respondents fearful that they will be accused of violating laws punishing “spreading false news” or “discrediting” the military with lengthy prison sentences.
Levada Center conducts interviews in the homes of respondents, but it has very little response.
Online polls that offer monetary incentives can be used to try and find a demographically-balanced sample, but there is still the issue of respondents being reluctant to give answers critical of the government. It is rational to refuse to respond or give a response that will be socially acceptable in Russia today.
Some researchers, like those affiliated with the Public Sociology Laboratory that examines public sentiment in post Soviet states, conduct fieldwork in Russia. They send their researchers incognito to provincial towns where they observe the social practices of support for war.
They found little evidence of a “rally around flag” effect within the provincial Russian societies. As an alternative, other analysts are turning to social media digital ethnography as a source of insights. Analysts unfamiliar with local contexts and digital media are at risk of mistaking the performative nature of loyalty as genuine belief.
‘Internal emigration’
Many Russians avoid politics and live their lives in a way that is sometimes called “internal migration”: they keep interactions with authorities at a minimum.
The practice is rooted in the Soviet era, but it was revived after Putin returned to power as president in 2012.
It is clear that many Russians are fervent supporters of war.
The state makes them visible and vocal, such as military bloggers who report from the frontlines.
You can gauge the true level of support for war, not only by examining opinion polls or social media but also through everyday actions.
Recruitment offices would be inundated if there was enthusiastic support for war. The recruitment offices aren’t overwhelmed.
In its place, Russia relies heavily on aggressive advertising, financial incentives, recruitment from prisons and coercive mobilisation. Hundreds of thousands have tried to escape conscription, either by fleeing the country or hiding from the authorities.
The pattern of symbolic participation is similar. The state-sponsored Z symbol continues to dominate the public space.
The Kremlin Star, with a Z-letter, will be displayed in front of U.S. Embassy, Moscow, Dec.
15th, 2025. Alexander Nemenov/AFP via Getty Images
Schools and churches are often used to collect humanitarian aid for soldiers in the frontlines or Ukraine occupied.
Participation is often shaped by administrative or social pressure. Many participants, however, frame their participation as helping individual rather than supporting war.
Real life vs. reality
Propaganda products with high-profiles often fail to resonate. The Russian music charts and streaming services are not dominated by patriotic songs, but rather by a mix of personal songs.
The strong sales of books such as George Orwell’s 1984 and Viktor Frankl’s Holocaust-memoir “Man’s Search for Meaning” suggest that readers want to better understand authoritarianism and trauma, and are not celebrating militarism.
Instead of the dystopian Western tale “Tolerance,” which is backed by the government, Russians stream the gay hockey romance “Heated Rivalry.”
Putin’s efforts to spread what he believes to be traditional values are not resonating. The divorce rate is among the highest on the planet, and the birth rate continues to decline.
The gulf that exists between what the Kremlin says is reality and the experience of the Russian people remains even as the Ukraine War enters its fifth year. This is reminiscent of a similar pattern that we saw in the last decade of Soviet Union, when the Kremlin lost touch with its citizens’ views.
The Kremlin’s masters should not ignore the parallels.
