It appears that the United States are moving towards a possible strike against Iran.
The Pentagon sent the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, along with bombers, fighter jets, and destroyers to positions that were within striking range of Iran on Jan. 28 2026.
The U.S. government has made several demands to Iran’s leadership, including a complete end to its uranium-enrichment program. The U.S. administration has called on Iran to limit the production of ballistic rockets and cut off its support of proxy groups such as Hamas Hezbollah, and Houthis in the Middle East.
Trump appears to see in this moment an opening to squeeze an Iran that is weakening due a bad economy and the massive protests which swept across the country early in January.
As a researcher on Middle Eastern security and proliferation politics, I do have some concerns. A U.S. war now may have unintended and widespread consequences in the future. This includes the possibility of accelerated nuclear proliferation around the world – whether or not the Iranian government survives its current crisis.
Iran’s threshold lessons
Even if U.S. military forces are used, the fall of the Islamic Republic remains far from certain. Iran is a stable state that cannot collapse quickly. It has an impressive state capability and a large population, with a coercive system and institutions designed to survive crisis. It is estimated that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (the regime’s military arm) has a population of low to high hundreds of thousands and can command or mobilize auxiliary troops.
Protesters on Iran’s 8th of January 2026.
Anonymous/Getty Images
The Islamic Republic has a deep-seated presence in Iranian culture after 47 years. A change of leadership is unlikely to produce a new start. Marco Rubio, Secretary of State for the United States told lawmakers in a Jan. 28, 2013 address that “there is no simple solution” as to what will happen should the government fall. He said, “Nobody knows who will take over.” Exiled opposition lacks organizational skills, is disconnected from the domestic reality and fragmented.
In this insecurity lies danger. Iran is considered a threshold state, a nation with nuclear weapon production capabilities but not yet reached the end of the line.
Three risks are associated with a threshold state that is destabilized: the loss of central command over scientists and nuclear materials, incentivised factions who want to export or monetize their expertise and an acceleration logic where actors race to achieve deterrence prior to collapse.
The past offers us warnings. Early 1990s, the collapse of the Soviet Union led to near misses as well as concerns about the location of nuclear materials. A.Q. Khan Network, which is centered on the father of Pakistan’s nuclear program (A.Q. Khan), proved that knowledge travels. In Khan’s instance, it went to North Korea Libya, and Iran.
What Strikes Teach
Any U.S. action, whether or not it results in a regime change, has profound consequences for the global proliferation.
Iran has chosen to be a threshold country out of strategic caution. In June 2025 Israel and the U.S. struck Iran’s nucleonic facilities. This attack, and Trump’s latest threats, sent a message that threshold status does not provide reliable security.
It is a stark message for other countries with nuclear ambitions, and it builds upon a series of harsh nonproliferation lesson learned over the last three decades. Libya gave up its nuclear program for normalized relations to the West in 2003. Eight years after the NATO airstrikes against Libyan rebels, Moammar Gadafi was captured and killed.
In 1994, Ukraine gave up its nuclear arsenal for the assurance of security from Russia and Britain. In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea after 20 years. It will invade the country in 2022.
We can now add Iran to this list. The country exhibited restraint on the threshold, yet was still attacked in 2025 by U.S. Bombs. It faces the possibility of a follow-up attack.
Mehdi Mohammadi is a senior Iranian advisor who has not forgotten the lesson. On Jan. 27 he told state television that Washington’s demand “translates into you disarming so we can strike when we choose.”
The logic is that if abandoning nuclear programs leads to regime changes, giving up weapons will lead to invasions, and staying at the ‘threshold’ invites war, only nuclear weapons can provide true security. Negotiating them or stopping development prior completion won’t do the trick.
I think that if the Iranian leadership survives an attack by the United States, it is likely they will continue to expand Iran’s nuclear weapons program.
IAEA Credibility
U.S. threats and strikes to destroy a country’s nuclear programs also undercut the international framework designed to stop proliferation.
It was working as it should, up until Israel’s and the U.S.’s earlier strikes. They detected, flagged and verified. The agency’s inspection regime was working because it monitored Iran.
The credible threat of military strikes can remove inspectors and disrupt the monitoring process. They also signal that safety is not guaranteed by compliance.
Why follow rules if they don’t offer protection? The credibility of IAEA, and the faith placed in international diplomacy to quell nuclear fears is at stake.
The USS Abraham Lincoln at San Diego Bay, 2024.
Kevin Carter/Getty Images
It is a domino effect
The latest nuclear standoff between Iran and the U.S. is closely watched by every nation that has considered its options.
Saudi Arabia’s regional rival Iran has not kept its nuclear ambitions a secret. Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman declared publicly that Saudi Arabia would seek nuclear weapons if Iran pursued them.
A U.S. attack on Iran, however, would not be reassuring to Washington’s Gulf Allies. It could even make them more uneasy. In June 2025, the U.S. launched strikes against Iran to defend Israel and not Saudi Arabia. Gulf leaders could conclude that American military actions are directed at preferred partners and not necessarily them. If U.S. security is not universal but selective, it would be rational to take independent measures.
Saudi Arabia is hedging against American inreliability, and regional instability, by enhancing its defense co-operation with Pakistan. Gulf Kingdom has heavily invested in Pakistani capabilities, and many analysts think that they have an understanding regarding Pakistan’s arsenal of nuclear weapons.
Turkey has, on the other hand, expressed a desire for an independent nuclear capability and complained about NATO’s arrangements. Recep Tayyip Erdoan asked in 2019 why Turkey shouldn’t possess nuclear weapons while others in the area do. A Turkish-backed attack against Iran could accelerate Turkish hedging, and trigger an indigenous weapons program.
The nuclear cascade is unlikely to stop in the Middle East. South Korea and Japan are non-nuclear countries largely due to their confidence in American deterrence. Seoul and Tokyo would be concerned about the regional proliferation, and the possibility that a destabilized Iran could export its scientists, know-how and technology.
An emerging counter-order?
Arab Gulf monarchies understand the risks. This is why they have lobbyed against military action by the Trump administration despite Tehran’s being antagonism to Gulf state desire to de-risk the region.
Already, the American-led security structure in the region is under pressure. The regional security architecture led by the United States is already under strain.
The Trump administration’s potential attacks against Iran could, in turn, lead to a diminished American influence as the Middle East divides itself into different spheres.
It is most frightening to me that this could be a lesson for every nuclear-armed state that the only way they can achieve security is by possessing a bomb.
