Myanmar, one of Russia’s few allies left, was also contacted by the United States about military aid and minerals.
Min Aung Hlaing visited Russia on March 4, 2025. This was Min Aung Hlaing’s fourth official trip since the 2021 coup that saw military take over power.
The coup in Myanmar ended the decade-long arrangement of power sharing between the military and democratically-elected government. It sparked peaceful protests which soon turned into an organized national armed resistance, known as Spring Revolution. A government crackdown followed.
According to the estimates of Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, the civil war has now entered its fourth year and resulted in 6,000 deaths, 29000 arrests, and over 3.3 millions displaced people. According to estimates from the human rights group Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, the civil war pits Myanmar’s militaries, who have had a stranglehold over the country’s politics in the last six decades, up against an opposition made up of ethnic minorities such as the Karen National Union and Kachin Independence Army.
All sides are increasingly dependent on fuel and weapons imported from abroad, as there is no end in sight to the conflict.
This raises a very important question. Could shifting global power alignments – particularly China, Russia, and the U.S.A. – change the outcome of Myanmar’s Civil War?
Russia: Myanmar’s ‘forever friend’
Myanmar’s military has sought support from Russia throughout the civil conflict. It is a convenient alliance for both nations, as they are sanctioned heavily and viewed as “pariahs”.
On March 4, 2025 in Moscow, Russia, Russian President Vladimir Putin welcomes Myanmar’s Prime Minister Min Aung Hlaing.
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Min Aung Hlaing, during his last visit to Moscow granted Russia the rights to mine minerals from conflict areas in Myanmar and to build an oil refinery in Dawei.
Since many decades, Russia exports oil to Myanmar. Moscow uses Myanmar as a transit country to send oil from the Ukraine to China to try to reduce the effects of Western energy sanctions. In a bid to ease the labor shortage in Russia, Myanmar agreed to provide skilled workers.
The mutual agreement also covers defense and security issues. Myanmar and Russia conduct joint naval exercises. Moscow also supplies weapons and train personnel to the Myanmar military government.
The war in Ukraine has weakened Moscow’s international standing, and any benefit that might have accrued from Russia being a sponsor is now diluted. If this were to change as the U.S. government seems eager for, it would benefit Myanmar by providing the military with a more powerful ally in the international arena.
The warming of relations between Russia, the U.S. and Myanmar could therefore be detrimental to Myanmar’s many opposition groups. The Trump administration has already made it so that resistance groups in Myanmar can’t rely as much on Washington’s support. And there’s also no guarantee the European Union will step up to help fill that gap, especially with the possibility of the United States withdrawing its support for Ukraine.
US shifts its focus away from Myanmar
Washington nominally supported Spring Revolution.
U.S. offers shelter to Myanmar’s dissidents including the exiled leadership of the National Unity Government (NUG) and has called for sanctions on the military.
This support is largely symbolic. Washington has yet to recognize the NUG officially as Myanmar’s legitimate government, a move that would prevent it from giving the $1 billion in Federal Reserve funds held by Washington to democratic representatives. The money would be used to both bolster resistance efforts and provide much needed aid to the people of Myanmar.
The U.S. Foreign Policy under Trump is having ripple effects in Myanmar.
Trump’s White House has defunded the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the agency tasked to fund Myanmar under the 2023 Burma Act. This act authorized sanctions against the military and support for those who oppose the junta, as well as assistance for Myanmar’s people.
Recent U.S. cuts have led to the suspension of services such as Voice of America, Radio Free Asia and others. The result is that the people of Myanmar now have less access to accurate information, and more importantly fewer media outlets to help them represent their views.
The future of democracy could be affected by the U.S. decision to either continue supporting the opposition, or to engage in dialogue with the military regime and support elections that are expected to take place later this year.
Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of Myanmar’s opposition party, was encouraged by U.S. president Barack Obama to participate in elections.
Image: Soe Than win/AFP via Getty Images
Myanmar had seen a similar U.S. reverse before.
Washington has supported for a very long time the boycott by the opposition of elections which guaranteed military power. In 2009, however, Barack Obama’s administration sent a signal to the National League for Democracy, which was then led by the now imprisoned Nobel Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi. The message stated that Washington would accept the results of the elections held by the military as part of its “pragmatic” engagement with the ruling junta.
The NLD, which had refused to participate in previous elections, was forced into cooperation by the participation of the 2012 by-elections.
The NLD’s sweeping win – which led to the NLD winning the national election in 2015 – legitimized a military-dominated system, where a quarter seat of the parliamentary chamber is reserved for officers. The NLD was able to form a coalition government, but only with the generals’ consent.
Now, the political climate is very different than it was in 2012. Years of resistance have weakened the army significantly. Even if NUG (which is made up of members of NLD, other parties and political groups) feels compelled by the law to take part in the elections, other ethnic and resistance armies are likely to choose differently. The decentralized resistance movement has made regional autonomy a reality. Elections will not meet the demands of various ethnic armies and groups.
Chinese stability push
China could play a larger role in the civil war if the U.S. reduces its aid to Myanmar and supports the opposition.
Beijing and Washington have always had close ties with the NLD, an opposition party. In 2020, President Xi Jinping signed a number of infrastructure agreements as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
China initially withdrew its support for Myanmar after the coup of 2021. Beijing, however, has tried to revive bilateral projects that were canceled or stopped due to stalled negotiations. It also supports reconciliation and positions itself as an impartial mediator.
China is most concerned about spillovers from war. Beijing was therefore concerned in October 2023 when a coalition of ethnic groups with armed forces launched a major campaign against the military, for fear of the spreading of instability along the China-Myanmar frontier.
Chinese investment in Myanmar has stalled since the outbreak of civil war. Lawlessness in Myanmar is leading to an increase of online scams, which are mostly run by Chinese. Chinese nationals have also been forced into working as scammers.
China’s main goal is to see a stable Myanmar. China’s chosen strategy, which is to force warring parties into signing ceasefire agreements to achieve this goal, hasn’t been successful so far.
It could all change. This could change. Resistance groups may feel more pressure to accept China as mediator. With this new calculus in place, it may be more important than ever to reach a solution through negotiation.
A hasty ceasefire, despite its necessity, does not equal a permanent solution. The shifting geopolitics between the U.S., Russia and China will have an impact on Myanmar’s civil conflict, but they won’t do much to promote democracy or peace in that country.
